This paper analyzes the impact of differences in supply of and demand for private equity financing on the performance of buyouts. Using a unique and proprietary sample of 684 buyout investments in North America and Europe, we show that buyout performance (a) decreases when large volumes of private equity commitments are looking for suitable acquisition targets and (b) increases when macroeconomic conditions are such that demand for private equity financing is high. These findings remain unchanged if we control for the idiosyncrasies of individual investment periods, transaction size, holding period and industry sector of individual investment and the vintage year, the size or the age of the investing private equity fund. Our results support the view that the market for buyout target companies is not necessarily efficient, but that instead acquisition prices (and thereby transaction performance) depend on the competition by a limited number of private equity fund managers for a limited number of attractive investment opportunities.
Introduction
The market for buyout 1 investments is characterized by a great degree of illiquidity, sticky capital commitments and substantial variance in the supply of and demand for buyout capital over time. This raises the question of whether this market is efficient, in the sense that exogenous shocks causing shifts in demand and supply have no impact on security pricing 2 , or whether we observe price pressure effects (Scholes, 1972) in the sense that acquisition prices (and thereby transaction performance) depend on the competitive conditions in the market for buyout capital.
This paper analyzes the existence of price pressure effects in the buyout industry. It thus follows a number of studies looking at price pressure effects in various other empirical settings 3 , the majority of which supports the existence of price pressure effects in the short-run. Most closely related to this paper, Gompers and Lerner coined the term "money chasing deals phenomenon" for their finding that too much money chasing too few deals in the venture capital (VC) industry increases acquisition prices for venture capital participations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) .
The present study constitutes the first analysis of the impact of price pressure effects on risk-adjusted buyout performance at the level of the individual transaction. It links riskadjusted transaction performance to various measures of the competitive conditions in 1 In the literature buyout transactions are variously labeled (e.g., leveraged buyout, management buyout, institutional buyout, management buyin, etc.) and often used synonymously. In this paper the term "buyout" as being the broadest is preferred which comprises the different facets of this transaction type. 2 Rf. for example Fama, 1970 or Fama, 1991 for an exhaustive discussion of existing theoretical and empirical research on the efficiency of financial markets.
3 For public companies rf. for example Shleifer, 2000; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997 and Goetzmann, 1986 ; for private companies rf. Gompers and Lerner, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 2004 and Stein, 1993. the market for buyout financing, while controlling for several alternative performance determinants at the fund-level and at the deal-level.
The corresponding empirical analysis was possible thanks to a unique and proprietary comprehensive dataset on thousands of North American and European buyouts entered between 1981 and 2003. Based on this data we calculate a profitability index that assesses the risk-adjusted return to investors relative to the performance of public market investments in the same geographic region and in the same industry sector for each deal. This approach is still novel in buyout research, as limited data availability has restricted most prior work to the use of fund-level performance or on performance measures that are not adjusted for risk.
We model risk-adjusted buyout performance as influenced by three proxies for the demand for buyout capital and by one proxy for the supply of buyout capital. We further control for the impact of (a) fund and investment size, (b) holding period, (c) particularities of transactions made during the time of the "new economy" boom and (d) the particularities of deals made in the first year of a fund's life.
The results of our ordinary least squares (OLS) regression provide general support for the price pressure effect hypothesis in the buyout market. Not only do our findings show a significant and negative performance-impact of increasing supply of buyout funding (the money chasing deals phenomenon), but also the corresponding significant and positive performance-impact of increasing demand for buyout financing (deals chasing money).
These findings remain qualitatively unchanged if we include additional control variables to capture the effect of (a) idiosyncratic characteristics of individual investment periods, (b) industry sector of individual investment and (c) the age of the investing private equity fund. It is further noteworthy that the performance of North American buyouts is not as much influenced by changes in supply as it is the case for their European counterparts. This is consistent with the view that the North American buyout market is more mature, and thus efficient, than the European market buyout market.
This paper is structured into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 gives background information and shows the relevance of our research question from the standpoint of both theory and practice. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the theoretical foundations of argument. Chapter 4 describes the analyzed dataset. Chapter 5 presents the empirical analyses and the results. Chapter 6 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes the paper.
Background
Buyout investments represent one investment class within the Private Equity (PE) asset category. This category is characterized by a specific governance structure based on the relationship between institutional investors and an intermediary (the PE fund). A PE fund is usually structured as a limited liability partnership, and is comprised of a management team (the general partner, GP), which manages the investments of the limited partner (LP). The PE fund's investors hold shares of the limited partnership.
Specialized buyout funds invest in companies that are in later stages of their lifecycle.
Subsequent to the transactions the target companies' shares are not publicly traded.
Additionally, but usually in smaller portions than the institutional investors, the target company's management team, its employees or new external managers can subscribe for equity stakes. 4
This special type of corporate acquisition has received increasing attention over the last decades from both the investor and academic community. This is primarily due to the steep increase in fund inflows into this asset class, which led to a rise in both the average size and the annual number of newly raised funds.
Buyouts already existed in the 1970s, but first evolved into a phenomenon of economic relevance during the 1980s in the United States. In the period between 1979 and 1989 more than 2.000 buyouts were conducted with a total transaction value of above 250 billion USD (Opler and Titman, 1993) . Until today, the largest buyout ever was the acquisition of RJR Nabisco by the PE Firm Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts (KKR) in 1989 with a transaction value of 29 billion USD (Dammon et al., 1993; SDC Platinum) . The first boom of the buyout market with the corresponding increase in the capital inflow into buyout funds was stopped by the breakdown of the high yield bond market in 1990.
High yield bonds were typically used to provide debt financing for the highly leveraged transactions of this period. The buyout segment gained importance again during the 1990s, not only in the US, but also in Europe, where the buyout market became sizable for the first time. Until today, the peak of buyout activity was the period from 1998 to 2000 during which more than 700 new buyout fund were raised (VentureXpert).
In parallel to the increasing interest of the investor community, more and more academic research has looked at different facets of the buyout phenomenon. 5 Despite these research efforts one could argue that to-date the buyout market still remains 'under-researched' relative to its economic importance and compared to the exhaustive research conducted on other asset classes, such as for example mutual funds. One key reason for the lack of quantitative research on buyouts is the general difficulties to obtain access to information on relevance variables, such as the characteristics of individual investments or transaction performance.
Within the field of buyout research, studying price pressure effects is of particular interest as both the supply of and the demand for buyout funding is very cyclical. In the last years, there has been consistently more capital flowing into buyout funds, than has been invested by them. A cumulative capital inflow into buyouts funds of 260 million USD between 1998 and 2000 substantially surpasses the aggregate buyout funds investments of 100 billion USD over the same time period. The corresponding 'overhang' in available capital in buyout funds did not decrease over the following years either.
The cyclical inflow in buyout funds leads to direct changes in the supply of funding for buyout investments. This is caused by the structure of buyout funds, which are mostly closed-end investment funds with an investment horizon of 10 years. The fund manager is thus obligated to invest the capital committed by the investors within this period of 5 Rf. Berg and Gottschalg, 2005 for a comprehensive overview over the literature on value generation in buyouts.
time. High fund inflows together with the closed fund structure lead to competition among fund managers for suitable acquisition targets.
Similarly, the determinants of how many buyout target companies are available at any point in time vary substantially. The demand for buyout financing can be expected to be influenced by several macroeconomic factors. As buyouts are part of the overall M&A market, one would assume, for example, that the number of available buyout targets correlates with the size of the M&A market. Furthermore, the firms' need for external financing may influence their tendency to seek buyout funding, be it through a buyout of the entire firm or the divestiture of an individual division through a spin-off buyout.
Finally, there may be a trend over time in the sense that buyout financing became increasingly accepted in the investor community and that thereby the share of overall takeover candidates that are available for buyout financing has increased.
Hence the competitive conditions in the market for buyout financing vary according to fluctuations on both the demand and the supply side. This paper studies whether this competition for a limited amount of deals causes price pressure leading to higher prices for acquisition targets and thus to lower return to investors.
Theoretical considerations
The question of whether changes in the supply of and demand for buyout funding influence acquisition prices for buyouts and thereby the performance of these investments is inherently linked to the more fundamental theoretical question of
whether and under what circumstances financial markets are efficient in the pricing of investment opportunities or whether one observes price pressure effects.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is one of the central premises in finance theory. It claims that security prices fully reflect all available information at all times (Fama, 1970) . Demand being perfectly elastic, exogenous supply or demand shifts then do not lead to a change in market price. Independent of demand for or supply of a security, a market price exists for each security which reflects the available information about expected risk and return of the security (Shleifer, 1986 and Scholes, 1972) . If markets are efficient, an increased capital inflow into buyout funds and the corresponding increase in the supply of buyout financing should thus not result in increased prices or lower returns of buyouts. The EMH assumes that every security can be substituted by another security or a combination of securities.
6
While buyouts differ from public securities analyzed in prior research on price pressure effects (Harris and Gurel, 1986 , Shleifer, 2000 und Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002 among others) in many respects, the following analogy can be made. Many buyouts companies have close substitutes among public companies and sometimes even used to be publicly traded themselves prior to the buyout. Furthermore, the absolute amount of capital inflow into buyout funds is still small compared to the overall capitalization of public equity markets. 7 Hence there are reasons to believe that, as long as the shocks to supply and demand are exogenous, neither expected risk nor return of the security should be affected by variations in supply and demand. Following the reasoning of the EMH, changes in supply of and demand for buyout funding should therefore have no impact on the pricing and performance of buyouts.
6 Rf. Miller, 1958 and Modigliani, 1961. 7 Rf. Gompers and Lerner, 2000 for the analogy with the Venture Capital industry.
An important counterargument to the EMH comes from behavioral finance theory that considers the possibility of systematic and significant deviations from the market price under certain conditions. 8 Of those conditions, the price pressure effect is of particular relevance to this paper (Scholes, 1972) . From the perspective of behavioral finance theory, an exogenous shock in supply or demand for a security leads to a short-term change in the price for this security. For example, an exogenous increase in the capital inflow into a certain asset class that does not reflect changed expectations regarding risk or return for corresponding securities will lead to an over-supply of capital seeking to purchase this security and thus to a short-term increase of the market price. As this price increase is only short-term, the risk-adjusted return to the investors during this short period is low relative to other securities. This holds true when every security can be regarded as unique in the sense that it cannot be fully substituted through other securities (Durand, 1959) .
This paper analyzes the existence of price pressure on buyout pricing over the period 1981 to 2003 for European and American buyouts. It complements empirical work on index admission of public companies (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991 and Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997) , fund inflows into open investment funds (Warther, 1995 and Wermers, 1999) , share buybacks (Davidson III and Chhachhi, 1996; Masulis, 1980; Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981 and Garrison, 1989) , block trades (Dann et al., 1977 and Kraus and Stoll, 1972) and Venture Capital (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) .
Large scale empirical studies on price pressure effects in the context of private companies are limited due to previously discussed data restrictions. One noteworthy exception is the work of Gompers and Lerner (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) . They analyze the impact of Venture Capital fund inflow on venture evaluations and find that inflows into venture funds increase the valuation of these funds' new investments. The phenomenon that they call "money chasing deals" is consistent with the theory that competition for a limited number of attractive investments leads to rising prices for venture investments.
Ljungqvist and Richardson and Diller and Kaserer conduct similar analyses in the context of the overall private equity industry (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003 and Diller and Kaserer, 2005) . Both studies provide first evidence that change in demand and supply influences returns of the private equity industry, including the buyout segment. Diller and Kaserer conduct analyses on the funds-level and look at the impact of fund inflows, skilled PE companies and risk on the performance of private equity funds (Diller and Kaserer, 2005) . They show that fund inflows affect fund performance as one would expect according to the behavioral finance theory. The focus of the work of Ljungqvist and Richardson is on fund level as well and their findings are consistent with the price pressure effect hypothesis (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003) . They also provide first indications on the impact of supply and demand on deal-level performance, but as the authors acknowledge, data limitations restrict them from calculating accurate performance measures at the deal level and more precise operationalizations for supply and demand. The data contained in this proprietary database has been complemented with information contained in commercially available data sources about the buyout industry (Thomson Financial VentureXpert) and general financial market information (SDC Platinum). In particular; this additional data includes the total amount of capital raised by all buyout funds in a given year and the corresponding aggregate yearly investments of all buyout funds. This data source, Thomson Financial VentureXpert, has been used extensively in prior research (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Gottschalg et al., 2004 and Diller and Kaserer, 2005) and is regarded as a representative database for the entire buyout universe by academics and practitioners alike.
Sample description
To derive a suitable sample of buyouts from the overall PPM database, we looked at the 2274 buyouts made by 170 buyout funds in the database and excluded all transactions with at least one of the following characteristics:
• Unrealized buyouts: The database includes buyouts that are still unrealized.
Unrealized in this context means that a PE Firm acquires a company, but has not
sold it yet. As no pricing takes place for these portfolio companies, determination of a reliable performance measure is not possible and thus the buyout has to be excluded from our analysis.
• Incomplete information: Due to the inevitable heterogeneity of the data source for the database (there is no standard format for PPMs), sufficient data to conduct the analyses are not available for all buyouts. We therefore only consider transactions for which information on the investment amount, acquisition and exit date, performance, the location, and the industry affiliation of the buyout were available.
• Out-of-Scope: The sample is restricted to European and American buyouts between 1981 and 2004. All other buyouts were excluded from the analysis.
Based on these criteria, we obtain a sample of 684 buyouts for which all required information is available from the proprietary PPM database. These 684 buyouts have been made by 170 buyout funds. 
Sample representativeness
As buyout investments are confidential and information on even basic characteristics of the overall population is not publicly available, it is difficult to assess how representative this sample is. One possibility to nevertheless gain some insights into sample representativeness, is to compare our sample to the largest and most comprehensive commercially available database on buyout funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) . This database (VentureXpert) is managed by Thomson Financial Venture
Economics and provides aggregate performance information on approximately 800 US and European buyout funds. In the following differences between our sample and VentureXpert funds are analyzed.
The average fund size of our sample (422 million USD) is slightly larger than the average size funds raised over the same time period according to VentureXpert (372 million USD) though differences in means are not statistically different at conventional levels (F-value of 0.046 for different variances and t-value of -0.862 for different means). The share of funds with investment focus on North America relative to Europe is also not different at conventional levels. In our sample, 77% of the funds focus on North American investments while 72% of the funds in VentureXpert do.
There exists however a significant difference in mean fund performance (p < 5%). The average (median) performance of the funds in our sample is 29.0% (16.7%) as compared to 17.2% (12.7%) for the VentureXpert database. This upward bias of our sample could be result of one or several of the following factors. First, one has to suspect some form of survivorship bias inherent in our research design, as we can assume that only PE Firms that were reasonably successful with their first fund send a PPM to raise money for a subsequent fund. The worst performing buyout associations will thus be excluded from our sample. Furthermore, we need to consider that PPMs are marketing instruments and that some bias may arise from the self-reported nature of information they contain. Finally, there may be some level of selection bias, as our research partners do not necessarily receive all PPMs and we only received a (random) subset of their data. This upward bias however, has only limited consequences, as the objective of this study is to explain the performance impact of supply and demand variation, rather than to assess the overall average returns to this investment category.
As there is little reason to believe that the upward bias in our sample has a systematic influence on the price pressure effect for buyout investments, this finding should not a priori limit the generalizability of our results.
Empirical analyses
This paper analyzes the impact of supply and demand for buyout capital on the return to the buyout investors. Drawing on price pressure theory, it predicts that an increase in the supply of buyout capital will lead to higher prices. Along the same lines, it also predicts that an increase in demand for buyout capital will lead to a price decrease.
Consequently buyout companies acquired in the years with high supply are expected to have ceteris paribus a lower return to investors ("money chasing deals") while years with high demand are expected to have ceteris paribus a higher return ("deals chasing money").
In the following, measurement and operationalization of the variables to test these hypotheses are described and the results of the empirical analysis along with several assess are presented.
Operationalization and measurement of independent variables
Supply of capital available for buyout investments is approximated by the total amount of money available to all buyout funds that are active in a given region at a given point in time. The accurate assessment of this variable is challenging as it requires the consideration of cumulative capital commitments to and investments by buyout funds over long time.
Prior research (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003 and Diller and Kaserer, 2005) has simply used capital inflows into buyout funds in a given year as a proxy for the relevant supply of buyout capital in this year. However fund commitments are invested over the entire life of the funds (usually 10 years) so that funds from several vintage years compete for acquisition targets in any given year. Consequently this approximation can be misleading, particularly if one year with very low capital inflows follows a year with high capital inflows. By only looking at same-year capital inflows, the following year would be treated as low demand although the capital from the prior year has not been fully invested yet but is still "chasing deals" as well.
In contrast to existing research, we therefore operationalize supply of buyout financing through a variable that more accurately captures the overall stock of capital available to all active buyout funds. The corresponding variable capital overhang considers not only capital inflows, but also the past investments done by these funds. This is possible thanks to our cooperation with the Venture Economics division of Thomson Financial, which provided detailed information on fund commitments and investments over the fund life. 9 This information is critical in determining the capital available (the buyout capital supply). The capital overhang is determined by the committed capital to all funds raised in the and prior to the year of the respective buyout lowered by the amount that was already invested at the date of the regarded acquisition. To avoid that committed capital that the fund managers returned to the investors is no longer included as capital supply, capital that was not invested by a fund after 10 years, is excluded from the calculations.
Further, capital supply needs to be differentiated among the funds' focus on different maturity and geography of companies. We only consider private equity funds with an explicit focus on buyout investments for the calculation of buyout capital overhang. As a second proxy for the demand for buyout financing we consider the companies' investment opportunities and the corresponding need for external financing (debt or equity). This factor is operationalized through the Tobin Q. This proxy has been widely used in prior studies (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969 and Tobin, 1978) . A higher value for Q stands for more investment opportunity (e.g. Lindenberg and Ross, 1981) . We follow the Chung and Pruitt approximation to determine Tobin's Q 10 as follows (Chung and Pruitt, 1994) : The third mean to assess the demand for buyout capital is the social acceptance of buyout capital, which has an effect on demand for buyout financing beyond the two prior variables. Here the rationale is as follows: Even if owners are interested in selling companies and/or the companies' financing need is high, it is possible that sellers simply do not turn to buyout fund managers to sell their companies. In other words it is possible that we find no demand for buyout capital simply because the social acceptance for buyout capital as a mean of financing is low. In fact, the Private Equity industry went through significant changes over the last decades and gained acceptance among investors and sellers over this course. The acceptance of and the level of professionalism in the buyout industry has increased over this time period with more players accepting Private Equity as an asset class (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003) .
To operationalize this effect of the time trend related to the social acceptance of buyout The results of our study hold, however, irrespective of the removal of one or several of these control variables from our model.
<<< Insert table 4 >>>
Descriptive statistics of the theoretical independent variables used in this study are given in table 4.
Performance measurement
Buyout performance is measured as the total risk-adjusted return to the investors through a profitability index (PI). The PI represents the most sophisticated indicator to measure buyout performance and has several advantages over the widely used IRR measure (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) . 12 Its calculation requires information about the risk inherent in the buyout as well as the timing of its cashflows. The PI is defined as the ratio of the present value (PV) of all realized proceeds from an investment over the total invested capital and can be written as follows:
The key challenge in the calculation of the PI stems from the need to find the appropriate discount rate to calculate the PVs. Using overall public market returns as a the discount rate implicitly assumes that all buyouts carry the same systematic risk (beta of 1). This assumption has been frequently questioned (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Gottschalg et al., 2004 and Groh, 2006) . This study aims to more accurately capture the operating risk of different buyout investments in the performance measure based on a risk-adjustment according to the region and the industry the acquired company is operating in. To this end return data on 70 DataStream indexes are used as the basis for the calculation of the discount rate in the PI formula. Gottschalg et al. follow a similar approach in determining the operating risk-adjusted performance of private equity investments (Gottschalg et al., 2004) .
12 As a robustness check we replicated the analyses performed in this paper with the IRR as performance measure and the results qualitatively confirmed the findings of our study.
A PI of 100 indicates that the risk-adjusted return of the buyouts equals the one of a comparable stock quoted company. A PI above indicated a positive abnormal return, where as a PI below 100 indicated a negative one. The following descriptive statistics include only the buyouts with a strictly positive PI; i.e., those 608 buyouts that did not file bankruptcy. Bankrupt buyouts will be treated separately in a later section. The median PI in the sample is 207. 
Basic econometric results
The impact of supply and demand on buyouts has to be expected to be different depending on whether buyouts are successfully divested or completely written off. On the one hand, abnormally high acquisition prices increase ceteris paribus the risk of insolvency as they require high levels of debt service payments for a given level of fundamental performance. Hence supply and demand should have an influence on the likelihood of bankruptcy. For successful (i.e. non-bankrupt) buyouts, on the other hand, supply and demand influence the acquisition price and thereby the performance of the transaction. As the bankruptcy events (with PI = 0) cannot necessarily be seen as a continuation of the assumed linear relationship between supply and demand on the one hand and performance of the other, the analysis will be carried out separately for buyouts, which filed bankruptcy during the holding period. We first focus therefore on the 608 buyouts in our sample that did not go bankrupt and then specifically look at the determinants of bankruptcy in a separate analysis.
Non-Bankrupt Buyouts
To assess the impact of supply of and demand for buyout funding on the performance of the 608 non-bankrupt buyouts, we use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The dependant variable is the log of PI and the independent variables are the capital overhang to proxy supply and M&A volume, Tobin Q and time trend to proxy demand. In addition, we control for the impact of fund size and buyout size, the holding period and acquisitions during the time of the new economy or in the first fund year through control variables. We applied OLS regression due to its ease of application and robustness (Cohen et al., 2002) . The corresponding equation of the OLS regression reads as follows:
PI n = α + β 1 * Capital Overhang n + β 2 * M&A Volume n + β 3 * Tobin-Q n + β 4 * Time Trend n + β 5 * New Economy n + β 6 * Fund Size n + β 7 * Buyout Size n + β 8 * Holding Period n + β 9 * First Fund Year n + error terms ε n Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis. The left column shows the variables followed by expected sign of the coefficient. The right column shows standardized correlation coefficients and below (in brackets) White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. The significance of the correlation coefficients is shown as '*' with *** representing 1% significance level (two-sided), ** 5% and * 10%. The bottom of the table shows various model specification and diagnosis tests.
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The results of table 8 can be summarized as follows:
• Supply of buyout capital: The effect of the analyzed variable on buyout performance is highly significant and negative (p < 1%). This is consistent with the prediction that an increase in the available buyout capital leads to an increase in acquisition prices and thus to a lower return to the shareholders. This effect is also of great economic significance as an increase of 1% in the capital overhang leads to a decrease of the PI by 0.4%.
• Demand of buyout capital: All three analyzed variables are significant with the expected sign (p < 1% for M&A volume and Tobin-Q; p < 5% for time trend).
An increase in M&A activity, an increase of companies' need for financing and higher acceptance of buyouts all lead to significantly higher buyout performance which is consistent with the prediction that greater demand for buyout capital lowers acquisition prices (p < 1%).
It can be concluded that our results confirm the hypothesized negative relationship between supply of buyout financing and buyout performance and the hypothesized positive relationship between the demand for buyout financing and buyout performance, as all coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant in their impact on buyout performance. This finding is in line with the related study by Gompers and Lerner who document the existence of the "money chasing deal" effect on the pricing of venture capital participations (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) .
Model fit and diagnosis tests are reported at the end of An R 2 of 5.7% for the overall model also makes intuitive sense. It shows the relevance of the price pressure effect as a determinant of buyout performance. On the other hand intuitively one would not expect the level of competition for buyout investments to explain much more than 5 to 10 percent of the overall variation in buyout performance.
After all, our model does not include any measures of other important variables such as the structure of the deal or any initiatives taken to restructure the company after its acquisition.
Determinants of Bankruptcy
We can then shift our focus to the question of whether supply of and demand for buyout financing influence the likelihood of buyouts going bankrupt. To address this question, we perform a logistic regression analysis (maximum-likelihood logit estimation with White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors). A dummy variable (1 for bankrupt buyouts) is created and used as the dependant variable. The independent variables remain as before. Table 9 shows the results of the analysis in the same format as table 8.
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The results show that supply of and demand for buyout capital does not significantly affect the likelihood of buyout bankruptcy. It is noteworthy, however, that large funds seem to be more likely to invest in buyouts that eventually go bankrupt. A possible explanation of this effect is that smaller funds are more risk averse and avoid investing in buyout companies with a high likelihood of failure. Another interesting though intuitive finding is that a longer holding period increases the likelihood of bankruptcy.
In fact this result may well be the manifestation of the inverse causality. If a buyout goes bankrupt, the buyout fund manager has incentives to wait as long as possible until she reports the bad news.
Differences between Europe and North America
European and North American buyouts have different structures and different maturity. 14 In the following, we analyze structural differences in the effect of the supply for and the demand of buyout financing between transactions in North America and Europe. To this end, the sample is divided into these two regions. The same regression model is used as in prior analyses. Table 10 shows the results.
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The results for Europe and North America overall support the price pressure effect hypothesis. However, there appear to be some significant differences between the two sub-samples with respect to the nature of the price pressure effect
The most important difference is that for North American buyouts the supply of buyout capital (the "money chasing deals" phenomenon) is not statistically significant. For
European buyouts, however, this capital supply effect is significant (p < 5%). On the capital demand side, we also see important differences. The performance effect of M&A activity is positive and statistically significant (p < 1%) for European as well as North American buyouts. For European companies no impact of demand caused by need for internal financing (as measured though Tobin's Q) was identified, while this effect is significant and positive (p < 5%) for North American Buyouts.
A look at the control variables indicates that buyouts executed during the time of the new economy performed worse in Europe (p < 1%), but no significant differences could be identified for North American buyouts. Moreover buyouts in the first fund vintage year were only performing better in North America (p < 10%). Overall it is interesting to see that the explanatory power of our model is much larger for the European subsample (R 2 of 10%) than for the sample of North American Buyouts (R 2 of 5.4%).
Conclusion
It was the objective of this paper to analyze whether or not differences in the supply of and the demand for private equity financing have a significant influence on the performance of buyouts. We thereby assess whether the market for buyout financing can be considered "efficient" in the sense of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) or whether price pressure effects (Scholes, 1972) exist as suggested by behavioral finance theory. The latter predicts acquisition prices (and thereby transaction performance) to depend on the supply of and the demand for buyout capital.
To test this hypothesis, we modeled risk-adjusted buyout performance as determined by three proxies for the demand for capital for buyout transactions and by one proxy for the supply of buyout capital. We further control for the impact of (a) fund and investment size, (b) holding period, (c) particularities of transactions made during the time of the "new economy" boom and (d) the particularities of deals made in the first year of a fund's life. The results of our analysis provide general support for the existence of price pressure effects in the buyout market, as the supply of buyout funding has a significant and negative impact on risk-adjusted buyout performance and the demand for buyout funding have a significant and positive impact on risk-adjusted buyout performance. Hence we find evidence for the presence of a "money chasing deals" phenomenon (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) , as well as of the corresponding effect of "deals chasing money". These findings are robust to different operationalizations of our independent variables and remain qualitatively unchanged if we include additional control variables to capture the effect of (a) idiosyncratic characteristics of individual investment periods, (b) the industry sector of individual investments and (c) the age of the investing private equity fund. It is further noteworthy that US buyouts are not as much influenced by changes in supply as their European counterparts. This is consistent with the notion that the North American buyout market is more efficient than the European market.
Our results support the view that the market for buyout target companies is not necessarily efficient, but that acquisition prices (and thereby transaction performance) depend on the competition by a limited number of private equity fund managers for a limited number of attractive investment opportunities. This is consistent with the findings by numerous other empirical studies that found evidence for the existence of price pressure effects in other markets. 15
Our results have also important implications for practitioners. If capital supply is indeed negatively related to buyout performance, the increasing capital overhang in recent years may be one factor that contributes to a falling average performance of this asset class. As capital commitments into buyout funds currently rise towards new peaks, investors may raise concerns about the expected future return to buyout fund investments.
Additional Robustness Checks
In order to assess the validity of the regression model this section contains several robustness tests. As indicated in chapter 5.3 ( only difference is that the holding period is now significant (p < 1%). The longer the buyout fund has the buyout in its portfolio, the lower their return is. This supports the argument that buyout funds are able to improve the company value in the short-term to maximize value for the investors. It can be concluded that the presented results are robust to various different statistical methods.
To further verify the sensitivity of our results to the effect of additional fund, investment or industry characteristics, we conducted three additional robustness checks.
In these we added three sets of control variables to our OLS regression model. In the first model ( Significance level (two-sided) for the coefficients is illustrated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
